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Summary
This report chronicles major developments in the thaw between North and South
Korea that followed the historic inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000.   In the
months that followed the summit, the two Koreas developed a new dialogue, which
included several inter-ministerial talks, a meeting of defense ministers, talks on
economic cooperation, and family reunions.  The sheer breadth and depth of the
dialogue indicates to some analysts that Seoul and Pyongyang are trying in earnest to
regularize and institutionalize the rapprochement, in contrast to previously ephemeral
thaws in 1972, 1985 and the early 1990s.  There have been several setbacks, however,
leading many critics to wonder whether North Korea’s diplomatic outreach is merely
a tactic to obtain economic assistance and reduce the U.S. troop presence in South
Korea.  
Inter-Korean diplomacy has effectively come to a halt since the March 7, 2001
summit between Presidents Bush and Kim.  At their meeting, President Bush
reiterated that his administration, which is conducting a review of U.S. policy toward
Pyongyang, is likely to insist on more reciprocity from North Korea in terms of
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs and its conventional forces.  Following the
Bush-Kim summit, North Korea cancelled scheduled inter-ministerial talks and Red
Cross talks.  It also rejected a South Korean proposal to field inter-Korean ping pong
team for the World Table Tennis Championships in Japan in late April 2001.  Also,
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s trip to Seoul appears unlikely to occur in the first
half of 2001.
This report will be updated periodically.
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1 North and South Korea’s formal names are the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively.  
2 Korea Herald, June 20, 2000.
3 For more on South Korea’s “sunshine policy” toward North Korea, see CRS Report
RL30188, South Korea’s Sunshine Policy, by Rinn-Sup Shinn.
North-South Korean Relations: A Chronology
of the “New” Dialogue
Background
The Historic June 2000 Summit.  On June 13, 2000, South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung flew to Pyongyang for a three-day summit with North
Korea’s paramount leader, Kim Jong-il.  The meeting was the first-ever between the
leaders of North and South Korea, which have been divided since 1945 and officially
at war since 1950.1   The two Kims signed a joint declaration pledging, among other
things, to work towards eventual reunification, open a dialogue between government
officials, engage in economic cooperation, permit family reunions, and engage in
cultural and athletic exchanges. Upon his return to Seoul, Kim Dae Jung stated that
Kim Jong-il had verbally agreed that even if North-South tensions continued to be
reduced, U.S. troops should remain in South Korea to help preserve regional and
peninsular stability.  “It became clear,” the South Korean president continued, “that
we will not ever go to war again.”2
The Ebb and Flow of the New Inter-Korean Dialogue.  Since the North-
South summit, inter-Korean interchanges have alternated between bursts of meetings
and lulls in public activity.  In the summer and fall of 2000, North-South interchanges
flowed, as the two Koreas rapidly developed a new dialogue.  Four rounds of inter-
ministerial talks were held, the two countries’ defense ministers met for the first time,
talks on economic cooperation commenced, the two sides marched together at the
2000 Sydney Olympics, and emotional reunions were held among hundreds of families
separated by the inter-Korean divide.  South Korean President Kim stated his desire
to negotiate a North-South peace agreement, which would officially end the Korean
War, before he leaves office in February 2003.  Moreover, numerous South Korean
businesses and citizens forged their own contacts with North Korea, a development
made possible when President Kim – under his so-called “sunshine policy” of trying
to induce more cooperative behavior from North Korea through engaging Pyongyang
– relaxed Seoul’s previous insistence that the government monopolize all contact with
the North.3 
In October of 2000 North Korea slowed the pace of the dialogue, leading to the
postponement and delay of  scheduled family reunions and several meetings.  Inter-
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Normality,” Comparative Connections, 1st Quarter 2001, available at
[http://www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html#nksk].
Korean activity again picked up from November 2000 to January 2001, with the talks
entering a new phase: ministerial-level talks shifted from meeting approximately every
month to every quarter, with more frequent working-level meetings expected to
provide forward momentum.4  Kim Jong-il’s business-oriented trip to China,
combined with talk of “new thinking” in the state-run North Korean press, seemed to
promise more breakthroughs in 2001.
Such hopes were frustrated, however, as North Korea abruptly called off inter-
ministerial talks planned for March, probably in response to the Bush Administration’s
calls for stricter reciprocity and greater transparency in dealing with Pyongyang.
Moreover, working-level meetings produced few concrete results.  Economic talks
became bogged down over North Korea’s demand that the South provide 500,000
kw of electricity.  Although military-to-military talks in February produced an
agreement on rules of operation for construction of a railroad through the DMZ,
North Korea has yet to sign and ratify the pact.  Kim Jong-il’s reciprocal visit to
South Korea has yet to be scheduled, making it increasingly unlikely that the trip will
take place in the first half of 2001, as South Korean officials had hoped.  North
Korean state-run media outlets have called on U.S. troops to withdraw from South
Korea, a demand reportedly also made by the DPRK defense minister during talks
with the ROK in September 2000. 
What are North Korea’s Intentions?. The biggest set of questions revolve
around North Korea’s intentions, which remain opaque.  Is its diplomatic opening a
sign that Kim Jong-il has changed his stripes, deciding to adopt a more cooperative
posture and possibly reform the faltering North Korean economy?  Or, are the North’s
actions merely tactics to obtain economic concessions from South Korea and its allies,
thereby propping up North Korea’s economy, rearming its deteriorating conventional
military, and preserving the power of its communist elite?  Events since the summit
appear to support the latter interpretation. Thus far, North Korea has largely
succeeded in steering the North-South dialogue toward discussions over economic
assistance and away from discussions over military confidence-building measures.
Meanwhile, a number of sources have reported that the DPRK has expanded its
military activities in recent months.  All this has led observers in South Korea and the
U.S. to criticize President Kim for conceding too much to the North without insisting
on enough in return.  In the winter and spring of 2000, the North diversified its
diplomatic contacts by establishing relations with a number of Western European
countries and inviting the European Union (EU) to join discussions on Pyongyang’s
missile program.
Criticism in South Korea.  Within South Korea, criticisms of President
Kim’s sunshine policy – particularly from the opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
– has mounted.  The GNP’s concerns are less over the logic of the policy – the party
generally has come to support some form of engagement with North Korea – than
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Korea, has accused the South Korean government of threatening to evict him from a protected
“safe house” in order to stop him from criticizing North Korea and Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine
policy.  See Yonhap, November 23, 2000, and “The Moral Cost of Engagement,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, December 28, 2000.
7 Joongang Ilbo, April 26, 2001. 
over its implementation.5  The GNP leadership has charged President Kim with failing
to insist on reciprocity from Pyongyang in exchange for Seoul’s concessions and with
ignoring important issues such as confidence-building measures and the several
hundred South Korean POWs and kidnaping victims said to remain in the North.  The
GNP also has criticized Kim for failing to adequately consult with the National
Assembly – in which the GNP is the largest party – and for trying to silence domestic
criticism of North Korea.6
The slowing of South Korea’s economy in early 2001 have added weight to the
GNP’s warnings that the government should avoid providing North Korea with
significant economic assistance.  The slowdown also has accentuated the serious
financial difficulties of the Hyundai conglomerate, particularly its North Korean
business ventures, which have been the economic flagships of Kim Dae Jung’s
sunshine policy.  Inter-Korean trade actually grew by a meager 0.8% year-on-year in
the first quarter of 2001, to $76.56 million, in part due to North Korea’s boycott of
the main shipping company handling the Inchon-Nampo route.7
Despite the lull in North-South activity, the sheer breadth and depth of the
dialogue, combined with the fact that follow-up meetings have been held and
scheduled, indicates that this time Seoul and Pyongyang appear to be making a serious
attempt to regularize and institutionalize their dialogue, in contrast to previously
ephemeral thaws in 1972, 1985 and the early 1990s.  Inter-Korean contacts are no
longer exceptional.  While the rapprochement is not yet irreversible, each subsequent
meeting and contact strengthens the newly intensified process.  Much depends on the
attitude of the Bush Administration, which has put talks with North Korea on hold
pending a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK.  
Implications for the U.S.  The thaw on the Korean Peninsula has several
important implications for the United States.  First, it is likely to increase pressure on
the United States, as well as Japan, to improve relations with North Korea. Second,
in South Korea, the perceived reduction in the North Korean military threat has
created a more critical public climate regarding the presence of the 37,000 U.S.
troops in South Korea, a new attitude that already has spilled over into other areas of
U.S.-ROK relations.  Third, public reactions to a reduction in tensions also could
influence a similar debate in Japan, particularly in Okinawa, over U.S. troops in that
country.  Finally, many U.S. observers want economic cooperation between the
Koreas to be designed in a way that will limit the North’s ability to increase the
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May - Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting.
5/2-4/01 - EU delegation to DPRK. 
5/9/01 - ROK and DPRK Red Cross chiefs to meet in Spain, where they will
receive award from the Spanish Red Cross for the organization of
reunions of separated families.
June - ROK Home Affairs and Administration research on two Koreas’
administration systems to be completed.
Past Events – 2000
3/9/00 - Kim Dae Jung’s “Berlin Declaration.”  In a speech in Berlin, ROK
President Kim signaled Seoul’s interest in extending economic
assistance to North Korea, in exchange for reopening an official
North-South dialogue.  
4/8/00 - The ROK and DPRK announce they will hold the first-ever inter-
Korean summit in June.
5/29-31/00 - DPRK leader Kim Jong-il makes a secret visit to Beijing, meeting with
top Chinese leaders. 
6/13-15/00 - The North-South summit, Pyongyang, between ROK President Kim
Dae Jung (shown at left in photo) and DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.  The
two leaders sign a vaguely worded joint declaration, which indicates
their agreement to work toward unification, exchange visits by
members of divided families around August 15, 2000, repatriate
DPRK prisoners in the ROK who have completed their jail terms,
work for “a balanced development” of both countries’ economies,
hold a dialogue between the two governments at an early date, and
increase social and cultural exchanges.  The declaration also mentions
that Kim Jong-il accepted Kim Dae Jung’s invitation to visit Seoul “at
an appropriate time.”  After returning to South Korea, Kim Dae Jung
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states that Kim Jong-il verbally agreed that even if North-South
tensions continued to be reduced, U.S. troops should remain in South
Korea to help preserve regional and peninsular stability. For details,
see CRS Report RL30188, South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy.”
6/19/00 - The Clinton Administration eases economic sanctions imposed on
North Korea since its invasion of South Korea in 1950.
7/31/00 - ROK and DPRK foreign ministers meet on the sidelines of the
ASEAN9 Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, the first time the DPRK
had been invited to the ARF.  The ministers issue a joint press release
agreeing to: hold ministerial-level talks starting August 29, hold family
reunions, reopen liaison offices in Panmunjon, and begin discussing
the reopening of severed railway links.
8/11/00 - Major ROK media publishers meet with Kim Jong-il and the state-run
North Korean press in Pyongyang.  The publishers agree on a plan of
mutual coverage, including a pledge to “avoid confrontation . . . and
stop slander.”  
8/15/00 - The North-South Liaison office in Panmunjon, in the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), reopened.  It had been closed by the DPRK in 1996.
8/15/00 - 200 families reunited.  100 ROK citizens travel to Pyongyang.  100
DPRK citizens travel to Seoul. 
8/23/00 - Hyundai and the DPRK reach agreement to begin construction of an
industrial park in Kaesong, a DPRK town near the DMZ.  Surveying
is to begin in September 2000 and construction is to begin in
November 2000.  
8/29-9/1/00 - 2nd Interministerial Meetings, in Pyongyang.  The ministers issue a
7-point joint press statement, which included the following items: a 2nd
round of family reunions is to held by year-end; the two Red Crosses
are to begin discussing the exchange of letters among divided families;
discussions will begin in September over holding military-to-military
meetings; and working level meetings will begin on economic
cooperation and on reconnecting the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad.  The
next round of ministerial talks is scheduled for Sept. 27-30.  The
DPRK asked for 1 million tons of food aid.  The end of talks are
delayed a day, reportedly due to DPRK opposition to military
confidence building measures, such as establishing a hotline and
holding regular military-to-military talks.  The communique did not
mention a reciprocal visit to Seoul by Kim Jong-il.  Prior to the
meetings, there had been speculation that such a trip would take place
in Nov. 2000.
CRS-6
9/12/00 - The ROK and DPRK announce that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il will
visit Seoul in the spring of 2001.  The announcement is made during
a meeting of key aides to both leaders.  The aides sign a joint
communique stating that working level economic talks will open on
September 25, defense ministers will meet, and a joint flood control
survey of the Imjin River will be completed within the year.  
9/17/00 - ROK President Kim’s party announces its intention to revise ROK’s
National Security Law, which bans praise of and unauthorized
contacts with DPRK. 
9/18/00 - The ROK starts work on reconnecting the Seoul-Shinuiju (DPRK)
railroad.  The ROK’s main opposition party boycotts the event.
9/19-23/00 - Red Cross negotiators meet and agree to two more family reunions
(Nov. 2-5 and Dec. 5-7, 2000) for 100 people from each side in Seoul
& Pyongyang, and to allow 300 people from each Korea to exchange
letters with separated families, which would be the 1st ever inter-
Korean mail links.  
9/25-26/00 - 1st-ever inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting, on Cheju Island
(ROK).  In a joint statement, the two ministers agree to ease military
tensions so as to “completely eliminate” the danger of war on the
Korean peninsula.  To allow the relinking of inter-Korean railroads
and highways through the DMZ, the defense ministers agree to begin
clearing mines and create an area of joint control in the DMZ.
Another round of ministerial talks is scheduled for Nov. 2000, and a
round of working level talks on the railroad is scheduled for October
2000.  The DPRK did not respond to the ROK’s confidence-building
proposals, which included: establishing joint military committees at the
working and upper levels, establishing a military hot line, and agreeing
to observation and advanced notification of troop movements and
exercises.  Reportedly, the DPRK defense minister called on the U.S.
to withdraw its troops from South Korea.
9/25-26/00 - 1st working level economic meeting, in Seoul, makes progress on
investment and double taxation agreements.  ROK agrees to give
DPRK 500,000 tons of food aid.
9/27-10/1/00- 3rd interministerial talks, on Cheju Island (ROK), end without much
substantive progress.   In a joint communique, the two Koreas agree
to set up a joint economic commission and to increased social and
academic exchanges.  Reportedly, the DPRK requested a slowdown
in the pace of inter-Korean projects. 
10/1/00 - ROK President Kim proposes a “2+2" peace initiative, whereby the
ROK and DPRK would sign a peace agreement that would later be
endorsed and guaranteed by U.S. and China. 
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10/6/00 - The U.S. and DPRK sign a statement in which the DPRK declares its
opposition to all forms of terrorism.
10/9-12/00 - Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the DPRK’s second-in-command,
travels to Washington, the first visit to the U.S. by a high-level DPRK
official.  The two sides sign a joint communique, which states that
“there are a variety of available means, including the four-party talks”
for forging permanent peace arrangements, a move that the ROK
hailed as a sign that North Korea might support President Kim’s 2+2
peace treaty initiative, thereby abandoning its policy of negotiating a
peace treaty only with the U.S.
10/18/00 - DPRK postpones scheduled 2nd round working level economic
meetings due to its “internal situation.”
10/23/00 - U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright travels to the DPRK. 
10/29/00 - 4th round of Ministerial-level talks are postponed.
10/31/00 - DPRK-Japan normalization talks. DPRK rejects Japan’s proposal to
offer it “economic aid” rather than financial “compensation” for the
40-year occupation of Korea.  Future talks are not scheduled.
11/1/00 - DPRK-U.S. missile talks open.
11/2-5/00 - Scheduled family reunions are postponed. 
11/6/00 - In talks with the United Nations Command (UNC) over opening the
DMZ to inter-Korean rail and roads, the DPRK rejects a UNC
proposal to transfer negotiating authority from the UNC to the ROK.
11/8-11/00 - 2nd round working level economic meeting, in the DPRK, which had
been scheduled for Oct. 18.  Four agreements are signed, extending
protection to foreign investors, ending double taxation, designating
local banks to allow direct financial transactions, and establishing a
bilateral body to settle potential trade disputes.  Officials estimate that
the agreements, which need to be ratified at the ministerial level and
then by legislatures, could take 1-3 years before they go into effect.
During the visit, ROK negotiators inspect a DPRK food aid
distribution center, the first time the DPRK opens its distribution
infrastructure to ROK inspection.  The DPRK also provides a detailed
accounting of food aid distribution.
11/16/00 - The DPRK and the United Nations Command in Korea agree that
ROK can have administrative authority over the southern portions of
the DMZ, where an inter-Korean railroad and highway are to be built.
11/28/00 - In a speech in Singapore, ROK President Kim calls for reopening the
Four Party talks  among the two Koreas, the United States, and China
as a vehicle to negotiate a peace agreement.  The talks, which opened
in 1997, had been stalled since the fall of 1999. 
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11/28/00 - 1st working level military talks to discuss administering the
construction of inter-Korean railroad and road through the DMZ. 
11/30/00 - 2nd round of defense minister talks, scheduled for Nov 2000, do not
take place.
11/30-12/2/00 2nd round of family reunions of 100 people from each side.  The
reunions, originally scheduled for early November, are a lower key
affair than the 1st round in August, in part due to protests in the ROK
against the cost of the 1st reunion.  The reunions proceed less
smoothly than the 1st round: the DPRK lashes out at the head of the
ROK Red Cross for his criticism of the reunion process, and the
DPRK detains an ROK reporter who had criticized the DPRK. The
two Red Crosses agree that letters between families will be allowed
at a future date.  
12/5/00 - 3rd round family reunions, originally scheduled for this date, are
postponed.
12/10/00 - ROK President Kim receives the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.
12/11/00 - ROK President Kim says he expects to sign a far-reaching pact if
DPRK leader Kim Jong-il visits Seoul in the spring of 2001.
12/12/00 - 2nd round working level military talks, in the DMZ, produce a
consensus on general principles for the repair of North-South railroads
and construction of North-South roads in the DMZ.  The two sides
begin to draft common regulations for emergencies or accidental
military conflict.  
12/12-16/00 - 4th round inter-ministerial talks, in Pyongyang.  In a joint statement,
the two sides announce: the establishment of an economic cooperation
panel to meet later in December; a 3rd round of family reunions to be
held in Feb. 2001 and a 5th ministerial level meeting to be held in
March; work would begin on a DPRK proposal to open its East Sea
waters to ROK fishermen.  The talks are more contentious than
previous rounds.  As a prerequisite for more dialogue, the DPRK
demands that the ROK agree to provide 500,000 kw of electricity.
The ROK refuses, convincing the DPRK to defer the issue to
economic cooperation panel meeting.  The DPRK protests an ROK
Defense White Paper identifying DPRK as “the main enemy,” pending
a substantive reduction of the DPRK military threat.
12/21/00 - 3rd Round working level military talks, in the DMZ, produces no
significant results.  The DPRK did not respond to ROK proposals for
detailed safeguards to prevent accidental clashes between the two
militaries, for a hotline be set up to link the two militaries, and for the
DPRK to prevent its ships from crossing the Northern Limitation Line
(NLL) demarcating the two countries’ sea border. The DPRK again
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expressed dissatisfaction about being designated as the ROK’s main
enemy in the ROK’s Defense White Paper
12/28/00 - Hoped-for military talks don’t materialize after the DPRK fails to
respond to an ROK proposal for more talks.
12/28-31/00- 1st South-North economic cooperation promotion committee
meeting, in Pyongyang. The two sides agree to prepare a joint
inspection of the DPRK’s energy situation in January and to discuss
joint flood control surveys of the Imjin River, which runs through the
DMZ. The talks stalled at one point when the DPRK demanded that
the ROK agree to provide electricity before other issues were
resolved. A second meeting is scheduled for Feb. 6-8, 2001 in Seoul.
Past Events – 2001
1/1/01 - In joint New Year’s editorials, three official DPRK newspapers state
that North Korea will place top priority on rebuilding its economy. 
1/1/01 - North Korean short-wave radio halts the broadcast of random
numbers, which are believed to be coded instructions to spies in South
Korea.
1/6/01 - Radio Pyongyang, the DPRK’s official station, broadcasts a lecture on
Korean unification that calls for a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty but omits
any mention of a DPRK-ROK treaty.  
1/8/01 - The ROK government delivers a draft inter-Korean agreement on a
number of key issues to the DPRK Monday, which includes the
provision of electricity, measures to prevent flooding along the Imjin
River, joint-efforts to construct rail and road links as well as an
industrial complex in Kaesong, the DPRK. An ROK Finance and
Economy Ministry official says the document also sets the timing for
a special team to determine the extent of DPRK’s power shortages
and for a joint team of experts to survey the Imjin River.
1/13/01 - North Korea’s Fisheries Ministry proposes inter-Korean talks on a
fishing agreement. 
1/15/01 - Kim Jong-il, accompanied by senior military officials, travels to
China.  Economic issues dominate his trip, which includes a visit to
joint venture plants and an economic development zone in Shanghai.
Reportedly, during a meeting w/CCP Pres. Jiang, Kim endorsed
China’s economic reforms.  Kim had last visited Shanghai in 1983,
when the city was just beginning its economic reforms, and had
criticized the reforms for ideological “revisionism.” 
1/17/01 - The ROK’s foreign minister announces that the U.S. and ROK have
reached an agreement allowing the ROK to deploy missiles with a 300
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km. (187 mile) range, nearly double the previous 180 km. limit set by
a 1979 bilateral agreement.
1/17/01 - At an ROK National Security Council meeting, President Kim sets
three basic unification and security guidelines:  improving
inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, particularly on economic
matters; establishing an inter-Korean peace regime; and maintaining
a steadfast security posture.  
1/22/01 - President Kim tells his Cabinet to begin preparing for “wholesale”
changes in the North-South relationship because it appears that Kim
Jong-il is ready to implement significant economic reforms
1/21-23/01- Chinese press accounts report that Kim Jong-il visited light industrial
factories in the North Korea city of Shinuiju, near the Chinese border,
and urged workers to abandon “old thinking” in order to adopt
modern technology and increase production. 
1/24/01  - In Tokyo, Kofi Annan says he hopes to visit North Korea in the first
half of 2001.
1/25/01 - The South Korean government decides to send 100,000 tons of corn
to North Korea through the World Food Program.  In 2000, Seoul
sent 600,000 tons of corn to the North.
1/25/01 - Presidents Bush and Kim hold their first phone conversation.
Reportedly, few specifics are discussed.  Bush issues a vague pledge
to coordinate closely with South Korea and to help the two Koreas
promote peace.
1/29/01 - Working level meeting on North Korea’s electricity situation (in
Kaesong, North Korea) delayed per Pyongyang’s request.
1/29-31/01 - At the 3rd Round of Red Cross Talks (in Mt. Kumgang, DPRK), the
two sides issue a six-point agreement scheduling a third round family
reunions on February 26, a letter exchange beginning March 15, and
a fourth round of meetings from April 3-5 in a to-be-determined
location.  No agreement was reached on the South’s primary goal at
the meeting - establishing a permanent reunion facility.  ROK
proposed 2 temporary centers, in Mt. Kumgang & in Panmunjon.
North Korea reportedly insisted on Mt. Kumgang.  Additionally,
South Korea proposed periodical or regular letter exchanges and an
increased number of families for such exchanges.
1/30/01 - Hyundai Asan sends half of its $12 million January 2001 payment to
the DPRK, a violation of contract.  The company blames snowballing
losses from the Mt. Kumgang venture, estimated to reach 488 billion
won ($391 million).
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1/31/01 - At a 4th round of working level military talks (Panmunjon) on
reconnecting the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad in the DMZ, the two sides
near agreement on joint safety regulations aimed to help avert possible
accidental clashes within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).  Landmine
clearance work within the DMZ is likely to begin in March.
2/6/01 - A three-person EU economic mission arrives in North Korea.
Reportedly, the group will stay for about two weeks to inspect the
DPRK’s agricultural and energy industries, in preparation for a
possible technical assistance program in the future.
2/7/01 - In the first high-level meeting between the Bush and Kim
administrations, Secretary of State Colin Powell and ROK Foreign
Minister Lee Joung-binn confer over breakfast in Washington and
issue a joint statement affirming the Bush Administration’s general
support for ROK’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation with the
North.  The meeting is notably devoid of much discussion of details,
however, and Powell reportedly makes it clear that there will no
development in relations between Washington and Pyongyang unless
progress is made in discussions over the DPRK’s missile program.
2/7-2/10/01 - Working level meetings on North Korea’s electricity situation
(Pyongyang) produces no results.  ROK repeats its proposal that the
two Koreas form a joint survey team, to which North Korea responds
that it would only agree to more limited surveys if the South first
supplies 500,000 kilowatts of electricity as soon as possible.  No
follow-up meeting is scheduled, though South Korean officials
propose a meeting in Seoul in early March.
2/8/01 - 5th working level military meeting, at which the North Korea and
ROK militaries reach a 41-point agreement on arrangements to
reconnect the Seoul-Shinuiju railway inside the DMZ.  The agreement
stipulates that: the two sides will two checkpoints on either side of the
military demarcation line (MDL); no military facilities will be allowed
in the area; the removal of landmines and explosives in the area will be
discussed a week before the de-mining work starts and the two sides
will jointly take part in it; a hotline between the military authorities
will be set up; to protect the ecosystem within the Demilitarized Zone,
the two sides agreed to construct an eco-bridge.  Pyongyang agrees
to send the document to the South on Feb. 12, after it was signed by
its People’s Armed Forces Minister, Kim Il-chol. DPRK delegates
declared there would be no more defense ministers’ meetings between
the two sides unless the ROK defense white paper is revised to
remove the designation of the DPRK as the ROK’s “principal enemy.”
2/11-22/01- First North Korean arts group tour of the U.S.
2/11/01 - North Korea notifies ROK that it will delay the conveyance of the
DMZ agreement on railroad construction due to “administrative
problems.”  A new delivery date is not mentioned.  Pyongyang earlier
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had agreed to send the document to the South on Feb. 12, after it was
signed by its People’s Armed Forces Minister, Kim Il-chol.
2/12/01 - Lim Dong-won, ROK director general of the National Intelligence
Service (NIS) and architect of DJ’s sunshine policy, arrives in the U.S.
for a “secret” week-long visit.  He meets with Secretary of State Colin
Powell, CIA director George Tenet and National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and many private
players on Asian security.  Reportedly, Lim tells U.S. officials that
President Kim will seek a vague declaration of peace, rather than a
formal peace treaty, in a future summit with Kim Jong-il.  Upon his
return to the ROK, Lim acknowledges to reporters that a conceptual
gap exists between Seoul and Washington over how to deal with
North Korea.
2/13/01 - Hyundai Asan pays $6 million delinquent from its January payments.
North Korea had demanded this payment as precondition for
considering Hyundai’s request to reschedule payments.
late February  2nd Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee
meeting is postponed.
2/20/01 - Hyundai Asan chairman Chung Mong-hun goes to DPRK to negotiate
payments for its Mt. Kumgang project with North Korean officials.
The DPRK rejects his proposal to cut the monthly $12 million
payment in half.
2/22/01 - North Korea warns it might scrap a moratorium on long-range missile
tests to protest what it calls a hard-line policy – including possible
revisions of the Agreed Framework – by the Bush administration,
following indications from the Bush Administration that it will review
U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
2/22-24/01 - Working level meeting in Pyongyang on joint flood control of Imjin
River makes little progress.  Seoul proposes that both sides conduct
field surveys of the area beginning in March and that both sides
exchange weather reports during the summer rainy season beginning
this year.  A follow-up meeting is not scheduled. 
2/26/01 - 3rd round of family reunions held. 
2/27/01 - Putin - Kim summit in South Korea.  The two leaders issue a joint
communique stating that the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty is a
“cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation of
international efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation,”
which many interpret to be a statement of opposition to the U.S.
missile defense program.  In the days after the summit, Seoul insists
that it did not intend the communique to represent its position on
missile defense.  While in Washington a week later, President Kim
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apologizes for the statement, which in retrospect he says should not
have been included.
2/27-3/1/01 - DPRK economic mission arrives in U.S.  The mission is composed of
deputy ministers and bureau chiefs of the DPRK’s foreign trade and
finance ministries.  In New York City and Washington DC, the
mission visits economic organizations and institutions, computer
companies, and universities.  Later report revealed that at a March 2
meeting with the IMF, the officials expressed their desire to join
World Bank. 
3/1/2001 - Germany and DPRK establish formal relations.  The two sides agreed
to a protocol that permits German diplomats and  aid officials freedom
of movement inside North Korea – a first.  The protocol also calls for
establishing a dialogue on human rights and arms proliferation issues.
3/2/01 - In a letter to President Bush, House International Relations
Committee Chair Henry Hyde and two other congressmen urge the
Administration to consider renegotiating the1994 Agreed Framework,
specifically by providing the DPRK with conventional power plants
rather than nuclear facilities.
3/6/01 - Secretary of State Colin Powell states that the U.S. plans to pick up
where Clinton left off in missile talks with North Korea.  
3/7/01 - The first Bush-Kim summit (in Washington), a meeting both leaders
describe as a “frank and honest” exchange of views.  Although
expressing his support for President Kim’s sunshine policy, President
Bush rebuffed Kim’s desire for the U.S. to continue President
Clinton’s policy toward North Korea.  Expressing his “skepticism”
about the ability of outsiders to verify agreements with DPRK, Bush
indicated that his Administration was conducting a comprehensive
review of U.S. policy toward North Korea.  President Kim reportedly
tries to convince Bush to adopt a broad-based “comprehensive”
reciprocity rather than a tit-for-tat strict reciprocity toward the North.
In a related move, Secretary of State Powell, backing away from his
statements the previous day, denies that a resumption U.S.-DPRK
negotiations is imminent.
3/8/01 - In a speech in Washington the day after his meeting with President
Bush, President Kim modifies his sunshine policy in two ways.
First, backing away from his previously stated goal of pushing for an
inter-Korean peace agreement, Kim says he instead would focus on
reactivating an inter-Korean non-aggression pact signed in 1992.
Second, Kim proposes that U.S. and South Korean adopt a North
Korea policy of “comprehensive reciprocity,” in which Washington
and Seoul would give Pyongyang economic assistance, a promise not
to strike first against the Communist  regime,  and support the North’s
bids to join global organizations in return for the North simultaneously
promising to observe the 1994 Agreed Framework, scrapping its
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missile program, and declaring non-aggression against the South.
This is a departure from Kim’s previous “flexible reciprocity”
approach, in which many benefits to the North were to precede  the
North’s concessions.  
3/10-11/01 - DPRK and ROK trade union representatives meet at Mt. Kumgang.
3/13/01 - Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, argues in a speech that North Korea has violated the 1994
Agreed Framework (AF) because it has not provided proof that it has
discontinued its nuclear program.  Hyde also calls on the U.S. to
renegotiate the AF and backs President Bush’s insistence on increased
verification of the DPRK’s nuclear program.
3/13/01 - 5th inter-ministerial talks (in Seoul) are postponed by DPRK hours
before the meeting is to take place.  Items on the ROK’s agenda
include briefing the DPRK on the Kim-Bush summit, scheduling Kim
Jong-il’s visit to ROK, and discussing military confidence building
measures.
3/15/01 - Letters exchanged among 600 families, 300 from each side, the first-
ever private letters to cross the DMZ.  The letters are permitted to
include up to three pages and two photos.  Cash and gifts are not
permitted.  Replies are not yet allowed, and the two countries’ Red
Crosses are due to discuss procedures for replies at their next Red
Cross meeting, scheduled for April 3-5, 2001.
3/21/01 - Chung Ju-yung, founder of Hyundai Group, dies.  DPRK leader Kim
Jong- il sends a telegram to the family expressing his “deep
condolences” over Chung’s death.  The DPRK also sends a 4-person
delegation to Chung’s funeral. 
3/22/01 - The DPRK invites the EU to join missile talks. 
3/24/01 - The EU announces that Swedish Prime Minister Goeran  Persson will
lead a delegation to Seoul and Pyongyang – perhaps as early as May
– for talks with the  leaders of the DPRK and the ROK.  Swedish
Foreign Minister Anna Lindh states, “It’s becoming clear that the new
U.S.  administration wants to take a more hard-line approach toward
North  Korea.  That means that Europe must step in to help reduce
tension between the two Koreas....”
3/26/01 - Hyundai Asan and DPRK reportedly agree to halve Hyundai’s $12
million monthly payment to DPRK for Mt. Kumgang venture.
3/26/01 - South Korea postpones scheduled continuation of work on the Seoul-
Shinuiju railroad because North Korea still has not signed or ratified
the January 2001 agreement on construction procedures in the DMZ.
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3/26/01 - President Kim shuffles the ROK foreign policy team.  Lim Dong-won
goes from the National Intelligence Service head to Unification
Minister.  Former Ambassador to the U.S., Han Seung-soo, becomes
Foreign Minister.  The new Defense Minister, Kim Dong-shin, has
conservative ties. The move is widely interpreted as an attempt by
President Kim to shore up his sinking popularity, and to improve
relations with the United States.
3/26/01 - Japan, the United States and South Korea hold talks in Seoul to
coordinate their policy toward Pyongyang.  Reportedly, there are few
detailed discussions over DPRK strategies because the US is still
reviewing its policy.  The next TCOG meeting is scheduled for May.
In bilateral talks, ROK pushes the US to accept the principle of
“comprehensive reciprocity” toward DPRK. 
3/27-29/01 - North and South Korean religious leaders meet at Mt. Kumgang. 
3/28/01 -  The DPRK rejects an ROK proposal to field an inter-Korean ping
pong team for the 46th World Table Tennis Championships in Osaka,
Japan in late April. 
3/28/01 - Ryang Gyu-sa, a resident of Japan with North Korean citizenship,
arrives in South Korea to play professional football for Ulsan
Hyundai. Ryang also plays for the DPRK national team. 
3/28/01 - General Thomas Schwartz, the  commander of the Combined Forces
Command in the ROK, testifies before the Senate’s Armed Services
Committee that the DPRK military is becoming larger, closer and
more lethal day by  day.  
3/28/01 - With North Korea’s tacit permission, an ROK navy ship travels two
miles into DPRK waters to rescue the crew of a sinking Cambodian
merchant ship.   The ROK ship reportedly notified the North, but
received no response.
4/3-4/5 - 4th Round Red Cross are postponed when DPRK doesn’t respond
to a March 22 ROK proposal for the venue to be Seoul. 
4/9/01 - North Korean patrol boats briefly enter ROK waters, on the southern
side of the Northern Limit Line that is the de-facto border in the
Yellow Sea.  The boats, which ostensibly are guiding North Korean
fishing vessels, retreat after being challenged by ROK naval ships.
The incident is repeated on April 10.  Similar incidents occurred on
February 5 and March 3.
4/9/01 - Hyundai announces the temporary halving of its Mt. Kumgang tours
4/11/01 - The DPRK denies permission for 63 ROK tourists born in DPRK to
travel to Mt. Kumgang, the first such denial for Hyundai’s Mt.
Kumgang project. 
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4/15/01 - The first-ever marathon in Pyongyang is held, with 600 North Korean
and 45 foreign runners.  The event is partially funded by foreign
sponsorship and commercial advertising, also firsts. 
4/17/01 - The reported date of Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia.  The trip is delayed,
however, reportedly because DPRK and Russia cannot agree on a
military and economic aid package to DPRK.  Reportedly, Russian
President Putin turns down Kim’s request for new Russian tanks,
MIG-29 fighters, and crude oil. 
4/18/01 - The ROK Unification Ministry grants a license to Kook Yang
Shipping Co. to run one freighter along the Inchon (ROK) - Nampo
(DPRK)  route at least three times a month for six months.  Until
now, only one company (Hansung) possessed a license to run the
route on a regular basis, and in November 2000 the DPRK  denied
entry of ships from Hansung to its harbor, citing their high costs,
effectively shutting down maritime trade. 
4/19/01 - ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo urges the US to resume talks
soon with the DPRK, saying that  ROK-DPRK ties were suffering
from the “uncertainties” of the US policy  review. 
4/24/01 - Hyundai’s Chung Mong-hun visits DPRK to try to resolve Hyundai
Mt. Kumgang financial problems.
4/26/01 - The ROK Unification Ministry announces that it will provide 200,000
tons (worth approximately $52 million) in fertilizer to the DPRK.  The
first shipment is scheduled for May 2.  
4/27/01 - The Russian and DPRK Defense Ministries sign an agreement to
upgrade the DPRK’s weapons supplied during the Soviet era.  
4/27/01 - ROK Unification Minister Lim Dong-won tells a National Assembly
committee that relinking the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad will be difficult






























































R u s s i a
*The North Korean Capital of
  P'yongyang is located in the
  province of P'yongyand-si.
Administrative Notes
*The South Korean Province of
  Kyonggi is administered from
  Seoul.
*The South Korean Province of
  Kyongsang-bukto is adminis-
  tered from Taegu.
*The South Korean Province of
  Kyongsang-namdo is adminis-
  tered from Pusan.
*The South Korean City of
  Kwangju is an individual
  Province, and the administra-










Source:  Magellan Geographix.
Used with permission.
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